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Abstract. Co-opetition is a perspective on business relationships which highlights the ambivalence of competition and coopera-
tion. Game theory is regarded as the mathematical tool for solving co-opetition related problems. The major step for introducing 
“co-opetition” into public discussion and economic research has been made by Brandenburger and Nalebuff in 1996. However 
they target a non-professional readership. A multitude of publications has followed, where the authors mostly focus on specific 
aspects of the problem and investigate particular industries. This paper gives a comprehensive literature overview on the field 
of co-opetition. 
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Santrauka. Bendradarbiavimu grįsta konkurencija yra verslo santykių perspektyva, kuri pabrėžia konkurencijos ir bendradar-
biavimo dvilypumą. Žaidimų teorija laikoma matematinė priemonė spręsti problemas, susijusias su bendradarbiavimu grįsta 
konkurencija. Viešas diskusijas ir ekonominius tyrimus apie bendradarbiavimu grįstą konkurenciją pradėjo Brandenburger 
ir Nalebuff 1996 m. Tačiau jų darbai skirti ne specialistams. Daugumoje publikacijų šia tema dėmesys skiriamas konkretiems 
problemos aspektams ir nagrinėjamos atskiros pramonės šakos. Šiame straipsnyje pateikiama išsami literatūros apie bendra-
darbiavimu grįstą konkurenciją apžvalga. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: bendradarbiavimu grįsta konkurencija, žaidimų teorija, Nalebuff ir Brandenburger knyga 
„Bendradarbiavimu grįsta konkurencija“, apžvalga ir literatūros apie bendradarbiavimu grįstą konkurenciją analizė.
1. Introduction
“Co-opetition” is a neologism that represents the ambiva-
lence of competition and cooperation in business relations-
hips. According to Dagnino and Padula (2002), “coopeti-
tion is a matter of incomplete congruence of interests and 
goals concerning firms’ interdependence”. According to the 
European institute for advanced studies in management 
(EIASM), “Coopetition highlights the need to overcome 
the oversimplified framework at the base of conventional 
approaches and proposes a description of more complex 
market structures where cooperation and competition mer-
ge together to form a new perspective. By widening the con-
ventional boundaries of the two more familiar categories of 
competition and cooperation, coopetition challenges the 
traditional framework addressing the surge of complexity 
of actors’ roles, strategies, objectives, processes and rent 
seeking behaviours” (EIASM 2009).
Though co-opetition has been mentioned in literatu-
re for the first time in 1913 by Cherington, just in 1996 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (B/N) introduced co-opeti-
tion into public discussion and research with their book 
“Co-opetition” (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). They 
understand co-opetition as an applied business theory in 
the spirit of game theory. However the level of their publica-
tion is oriented at a non-professional readership. Till today, 
though a variety of scientific publications has appeared on 
the field of co-opetition, which covers many specific aspects 
of the problem, the problem of a non-existing theoretical 
foundation and structure is not solved yet. The only publi-
cation which treats this problem so far is that of Dagnino 
and Padula (2002).
The paper gives a comprehensive overview over B/N’s 
book “Co-opetition”. A critical analysis about the proposed 
“PARTS model” is given. Additionally, a general overview 
over the literature referring to the co-opetition approach 
is given. General and specific theoretical contributions are 
presented. It is shown how the co-opetition idea has been 
used to describe problems in particular industries.
The aim is a deeper comprehension of the scope of co-
opetition as a problem of research (Ginevičius and Krivka 
2008; Liaudanskiene et al. 2009; Zavadskas et al. 2008a). 
2. brandenburger and Nalebuff ’s book  
“Co-opetition” (1996)
B/N explain “co-opetition” as an approach that intends to 
explain competition and cooperation in business networks 
in the spirit of game theory. The idea is to apply game theory 
to solve problems that are connected with business rela-
tionships and supply chains. However game theory is not 
introduced explicitly. 
B/N focus on the ambivalence of competition and coo-
peration in “value nets”. “Value nets” are an extended notion 
of supply chains where competitors and agents with comple-
mentary offers are considered. It must not be confused with 
the “value chain” inside of enterprises that was introduced 
by Porter (1985). Even if two enterprises act as competitors 
at a market, there can be various possibilities for them to 
cooperate, either by not attacking each other, or by tacit pri-
ce collusions, etc. On the other hand, cooperation partners 
generally compete in the question of profit sharing. 
B/N define five elements of a game as basic: 
Players (The paper uses the word “agent” to describe an  –
independent economic decider. “Player” is only used 
when the original term is important. However, “player” 





The initial letters yield the catchy word “PARTS”. It rat-
her shows the wish to get a slogan for the “co-opetition” 
approach than a profound structuring. Nevertheless, B/N 
use the “PARTS” elements as crucial criteria.
2.1. Players (agents)
Classically, a competitor is a participant on the same market 
who decreases the price/demand for the other’ products by 
increasing the value of the own products in the eyes of the 
customers. As the interests are in general antagonistic, the re-
lationships can be characterized by a “win-lose” situation.
“Complementor” is a neologism by B/N that means an 
agent that has offers that are complementary to the own 
ones. Complementors offer products/services that incre-
ase the value to the product/service of the own enterprise, 
but they do not compete at the same market. Customers 
appreciate a product more if they already possess or can 
get a complementary one. Roughly said, the relationship 
among complementors is in general “win-win” (the interests 
go into the same direction). 
Suppliers and customers are part of the same supply 
chain. However, in the co-opetition approach they are 
similar with the complementors in the sense of “win-win”-
relationships.
B/N argue that the distinction between “win-win” rela-
tionships and “win-lose” relationships is not as clear as it 
may look on the first sight. An enterprise competes with 
suppliers, demander and complementors concerning the 
distribution of the commonly achieved utility (i.e. profit). 
Thus, negotiations are a competitive situation. On the other 
hand, there are many possibilities of profiting by coordina-
ting one’s behavior with that of the competitors. Even if the 
explicit agreements are restricted by law, tacit collusions 
about prices, products, conditions, etc. (Besanko 2009) are 
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thinkable. Even if there is no direct communication, it can 
be wise for competitors not to attack each other, and to avoid 
price wars, etc.: B/N argue that “a satisfied competitor is less 
dangerous than a distressed one.”
An agent changes the “cast of agent” as soon as it is 
advantageous, by quitting cooperative relationships or fin-
ding new cooperation partners. Auctions are an important 
procedure to select new cooperation partners. In this paper, 
the agents that have the possibility to enter the game are 
termed “potential agents”.
2.2. Added value
An agent thinks about the maximization of his own pro-
fit. However in order to achieve this, he has to think not 
only about the effect of his own participation in the game 
but also about the effect of the other agents’ participation. 
Additionally, he has to understand whether it is advanta-
geous to bring added value to other agents, e.g. in order to 
increase suppliers’ or customers’ loyalty, etc. (“win-win”).
It is dangerous to try to increase one’s own profit at the 
cost of another agent (opposite of added value), due to the 
possibility of retaliation (“win-lose”). The scheme coincides 
with the classical prisoner’s dilemma:
“win-lose”, “lose-win”  “lose-lose”.
Added Value refers to the value difference between the 
participation (or existence) and the non-participation (or 
non-existence) of an agent, product, etc. in the game. 
2.3. Rules
B/N distinguish between 
governmental or official rules, –
cultural rules and –
rules in the relationships between business agents. –
In the relationship between business agents, B/N dis-
tinguish between 
mass markets and  –
individual relationships –
and explain, how rules can be influenced advantage-
ously. Thus an agent has to recognize which rules are advan-
tageous, which ones are of disadvantage and what are the 
possibilities to change them. 
Rules are principles that govern social behavior and res-
trictions. They define the way a game or sport, etc. has to be 
conducted, or how to behave in business, traffic, etc. B/N 
explain rules as follows: “most of the rules businesspeople 
play by are well-established laws and customs. They have 
evolved to help ensure that trading practices are fair, that 
markets keep operating, and that contracts are honored. To 
step outside these rules would be to risk legal penalties or 
exclusion from the markets.”
It is the question which rules will rule. In individual 
relationships negotiations are usually the prerequisite for 
cooperation. In the relationship towards a mass market, 
negotiations are often not possible. The supplier usually 
determines the rules unilaterally and customers usual-
ly do not have many possibilities to influence them. The 
governmental and cultural rules are termed by Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger “meta-rules”. They can be regarded as 
externally given. Nevertheless there is the possibility of inf-
luencing laws by lobbying, etc.
2.4. “Tactics”
The agents have to decide in general whether the game 
should be played transparently or opaquely. Each agent 
should recognize which perceptions by other agents should 
be preserved and which should be changed. However it 
is difficult to achieve such an “information control” over 
other agents where uncertainty is built up (e.g. by bluffing), 
preserved or reduced. 
Negotiations typically take place in a fog. Negotiators 
try to show and hide information deliberately in order to 
improve their position. However this is challenging because 
basically everything sends signals. Without sufficient relian-
ce among the agents, negotiations are likely to fail. This can 
be solved by a negotiator that is accepted by both sides.
The word tactics is presumably misleading because it 
refers to how to control the perceptions by other agents in 
negotiations. B/N say: “Games in business are played in a 
fog.” This means that the agents usually are confronted with 
the problem of incomplete information. “The job of mana-
ging and shaping competitors’ perceptions is an essential 
part of business strategy. Perceptions play a central role in 
negotiations. The domain of perceptions is universal.” 
2.5. Scope, boundaries
The agent should ask himself, whether to link/delink one 
game with/from another one e.g. by entering new markets 
or making longer-term contracts. If a new agent wants to 
enter a market, he should try to avoid competition. This 
can be done by occupying a price segment that is not that 
interesting for the incumbent(s), or bringing new products 
with the chance of failing. Particularly in businesses, where 
technology advances quickly, market superiority is decep-
tive. New agents may emerge with superior technology and 
the core competency of the incumbent in one technology 
may turn out as rigidness in another technology. 
The scope or the boundaries of a game are defined arti-
ficially. All games are connected with each other. Even if the 
separation of games is convenient for analysis, it must not 
be neglected that decisions might have unexpected impacts 
on any other issues. The complete game comprehends the 
whole world, but a model can only depict a small excerpt 
limited by region, time, technology, etc. 
Time is a crucial determinant for the scope of the game. 
Longer-term contracts assure the links between games of 
different periods and therefore can be a prerequisite to pro-
tect added value. On the other hand, longer-term contracts 
can be difficult to assert due to changing agents, changing 
added value, external rules and perceptions (Ginevičius et 
al. 2006, 2007; Peldschus 2008).
2.6. Analysis of b/N’s “Co-opetition”
B/N’s “co-opetition” approach is an important step towards 
a practice oriented business theory in the spirit of game 
theory. It is a comprehensive attempt to make highly abs-
tract or mathematic concepts in economics applicable. 
There is no other comparable concept yet that focuses on 
the ambivalence of competition and cooperation in each 
business relationship. Nevertheless, B/N’s co-opetition has 
some fundamental flaws, like that the foundation in the 
economic sciences is not explained, the internal structure 
that is disputable (Ginevičius and Podvezko 2008a, 2008b; 
Zavadskas et al. 2008b) and as it is targeted to a non-pro-
fessional readership.
The only economic theory that is mentioned is the game 
theory. However it is not clear in which way game theory is 
used and whether there are other theories that are in con-
nection with the co-opetition approach.
The “elements” “players” (agents), “added value”, “rules”, 
“tactics”, “scope” (PARTS) are not in a logical structure. The 
short-cut “PARTS” seems to be based on the intention of 
being memorable and easily accessible for a large readers-
hip. It is misguided from the point of view of priorities and 
the kind of chosen criteria. In order to show the structural 
problem, table 1 lists some important aspects that refer to 
two or more “elements” of “PARTS”, so that the “elements” 
overlap:
Table 1. Overlaps of elements, x marks the reference in 
B/N’s book “Co-opetition” 
Aspects by b/N Overlap of elements: P A R T S
1 Value net: determination of agents x x x
2 Value net: distinction between mass 
markets and individual agents x x x x
3 Value net: “potential agents” and their 
impact x x x x
4 Value net: “win-win” vs. “win-lose” 
relationships x x
5 Negotiations: restricted to relationships 
with individual agents x x x x x
1. The determination of agents concerns also the “sco-
pe” of the game. By each additional agent, the complexity of 
the game increases tremendously (Pin 2005). Furthermore 
the cast of agents is the result of negotiations, so that the 
determination of agents also refers to “tactics”.
2. The distinction between customers that are
individual agents and those that are,  –
mass markets (aggregated agents) –
is introduced at the element “rules”. However, the distinc-
tion between individual and aggregated agents could also 
be covered by the element “players” (agents), and therefore 
also by “scope”. 
3. Agents who have the potential to enter the game 
(“potential agents”) can be regarded as strategically very 
important. If an enterprise has a supplier and obtains an 
alternative, this has crucial impact on negotiation power 
as it decreases the actual supplier’s “added value”. 
4. “Win-lose” relationships are among competitors and 
“win-win” among the others relationships in the value net. 
They are introduced in “agents”. However, both “win” and 
“lose” refer to the “added value”.
5. Negotiations (chapter “tactics”) can have impact 
on each element, as “you can negotiate anything” (Cohen 
1982). However B/N omit to mention that negotiations 
are restricted to individual agents and it is not possible to 
“negotiate” with mass markets. The distinction between 
mass markets and individual agents is introduced in the 
chapter “rules”, but is ignored it the chapter “tactics”.
Hence, though B/N’s proposal of the co-opetition theory 
can be regarded as a good starting point for research, it is 
not implementable in the given form. 
3. An overview of the literature contributions to the 
“co-opetition” theory
The term “co-opetition” has been coined long time before 
B/N’s book without receiving public attention. Already in 
1911, Kirk S. Pickett of the oyster manufacturer “Sealshipt” 
coined the word “co-opetition” in order to describe the re-
lationships among his 35,000 oyster dealer by stating: “You 
are only one of several dealers selling our oysters in your 
city. But you are not in competition with one another. You 
are co-operating with one another to develop more business 
for each of you. You are in co-opetition, not in competiti-
on.” T. Cherington referred in his book “Advertising as a 
business force” from 1913 (Cherington 1976) to this first 
mention. The Californian historian R. Hunt reintroduced 
“co-opetition” in the Los Angeles Times (1937). However, 
none of these early introductions received any public at-
tention. For more than half a century there has not been 
any approved publication that uses this word. Ray Noorda, 
the long-time CEO of Novell Corporation, is regarded as 
Verslas: teorija ir praktika,  2010, 11(3): 256–265 259
260 H. D. Stein. Literature overview on the... 
the person who reintroduced the term co-opetition into 
public debate in 1992 (Fisher 1992). 
However the major impulse has been given by B/N 
(1996), though it is written in a non-scientific style. 
Afterwards, a multitude of literature contributions has fol-
lowed and refers to both highly theoretical questions and 
to certain industries.
Dagnino and Padula (2002) give a comprehensive intro-
duction into the theoretical research on the field of co-ope-
tition. They argue that co-opetition is a field that has not 
been researched sufficiently due to limited or non-existing 
theoretical foundations. In order to propose a foundation, 
they compare it on the one side with the mainly competi-
tive perspective and the mainly cooperative perspective. 
The competitive perspective is represented by Porter and 
particularly his seminal book “Competitive Strategy” (1980) 
and by Williamson and his major contributions on the field 
of “transaction cost economics” (1975, 1985). On the other 
side, the cooperative perspective is shown by Contractor 
and Lorange (1988), who emphasize strongly on the benefits 
of cooperation and regard them as sufficient incentive to be 
not seduced by possible benefits of opportunism. 
Co-opetition is described by Dagnino and Padula as a 
new perspective that emphasizes on the “partial or incom-
plete congruence” of interests and goals of enterprises if they 
are interdependent. It is regarded as an integrative theore-
tical bridge between the competitive and the cooperative 
perspective that intends to “rebalance” the respective biases, 
in order to generate an enhanced understanding of sustai-
ned business performance. Dagnino and Padula propose a 
“theoretical framework (that is) underlying the co-opetitive 
perspective”:
1. “Firms’ interdependence is both a source of economic 
value creation and a place for economic value sharing”.
2. “Firms’ interdependence is based on a variable-posi-
tive-sum game which may bring to mutual but not neces-
sarily fair benefits to the partners because of several com-
petitive pressures of different nature that may undermine 
their co-opetitive structure”.
3. In a variable-sum game structure, firm interdepen-
dence is based on “partially convergent interfirm inte-
rests”.
Song (2003) explains the significance of co-opetition 
in the port industry with the rationalization efforts of the 
preceding decade. Many port operators who previously ran 
only their local business now extend their business to the 
regional or global scale. This becomes possible by coope-
rating with competitors in order to reach the critical mass. 
Song presents as example the ports of Hong Kong and South 
China. As the ports remain independent, they are compe-
titors despite of cooperation.
Zineldin (2004) recommends to strategy and marke-
ting planners in organizations to consider potential benefits 
of collaboration and coordination with the competitors. 
He claims that “co-opetitive partnerships” are an effective 
response to environmental threats and opportunities. He 
shows possible preconditions for the survival of a “co-ope-
titive partnership” and compares it with a marriage. The 
participants get to know each other and make a “ceremony”, 
the signing of the business contract. Conflicts that can arise 
must be coped with clear and agreed mechanisms. However, 
divorce is always possible.
Luo presents in his book “Coopetition in international 
business” (2004) various issues of business relationships bet-
ween different countries. He regards co-opetition is a “loose-
ly coupled system in which agents maintain certain interde-
pendence without loosing their organizational separateness”. 
Luo’s typology of co-opetition is shown in table 2.
Table 2. Luo’s typology of co-opetition in dependence of the 



















co-opetition with global rivals,  –
co-opetition with foreign governments or the  –
co-opetition within one multinational enterprise.  –
He recognizes a simultaneous increase of competitive 
pressure and desire for cooperation between multinatio-
nal enterprises (MNE). Cooperation with a given rival can 
facilitate knowledge acquirement, technological progress. 
In the context of product innovation or the product intro-
duction in foreign countries it can reduce costs, risks and 
uncertainties. In many cases it is too costly or not possible 
because of laws for an enterprise to enter a foreign market. 
In these cases, cooperation even with a competitor might be 
inevitable. Luo recommends “co-opetition groups”, where 
the collective power of the “global players” (globally acti-
ve agents) is solidified towards “outside stakeholders” like 
home and host governments. Concurrently the “competiti-
on” helps to dilute anti-trust regulations or anti-monopoly 
demands. 
Luo delves into the relationship between MNEs and 
foreign governments and the interdependence in many 
aspects like resource sharing, market expansion and eco-
nomic growth. It is the interest of the MNEs to succeed in 
the market while government institutions are “controllers, 
regulators, clients or adjudicators of private-sector activi-
ties. On the other side, governments are (should be) inte-
rested in “maximizing social welfare, which is contingent 
on efficiency, equity and social considerations”. 
Luo develops ideas referring to co-opetition of dispersed 
subunits within a multinational enterprise. He argues that 
these subunits in different countries are interdependent in 
the sharing of resources and knowledge and in the rationa-
lization of the value chains. Concurrently they compete for 
the support by the corporation, resources, etc. He classifies 
enterprise subunits “aggressive demander”, “silent imple-
mentor”, “ardent contributor” and “network captain”.
Ren and Shi (2005) expressed the idea that reliance 
among cooperating agents determines the degree of coo-
peration and depends on long period mutual benefit. That 
is a comprehensible approach in the modelling of reliance 
development.
Gurnani (Gurnani et al. 2006) focuses on supply chain 
management. In a supply chain one enterprise refines or 
markets a product that another enterprise has produced. 
In order to increase the customers’ demands, an enterprise 
has to make investments into quality or the reduction of 
prices. This can be exploited by the cooperation partner 
that sees the possibility of suspending own investments and 
therefore acts as a free-rider. The authors propose buy-back 
agreements, quantity and quality commitments and infor-
mation sharing as counter-measures. 
Gnywali (Gnywali et al. 2006) delves into the advan-
tages and disadvantages of certain positions in networks. 
Networks are regarded as aggregations of bilateral links. 
Enterprises that have more links tend to be more influential 
and autonomous. These links can also refer only to parti-
cular issues. -For instance, enterprises that cooperate in 
research & development possibly compete in marketing. 
3 types of flows in supply chains are recognized: informa-
tion, assets and status. “3 primary levels of analysis” are 
determined: 
the industry level, where “patterns” of competitive and  –
cooperative activities across different industries are 
analysed,
the group level that refers to “competitive groups”  –
and
the firm level where an individual firm’s competitive  –
and cooperative behaviour is regarded.
Chen and Fan (2006) analyse the stability of strategic 
alliances. They try to find stable solutions by employing 
game theory in an attempt to develop a theoretical basis 
for strategic alliances. They argue that unplanned chan-
ges from the perspective of one or more partners lead 
to alliance instabilities, as soon as the bargaining power 
shifts. Furthermore, unrealistic goal planning, imperfect 
implementation or goal dissimilarities of the partners make 
strategic alliances in general not stable. However, alliances 
can bring an advantageous strategic competitive position 
against the competitors (Porter 1985). Chen and Fan also 
refer to the transaction costs economics (Williamson 1985) 
that emphasizes the negative effect of opportunistic beha-
viour in the relationships between business partners. 
López-Gómez and Molina-Meyer (2007) build a bridge 
to population dynamics. They claim that “partial coopera-
tion” or an interaction with competitive and cooperative 
aspects can lead to an explosive increment of productivity, 
creativity, diversity and efficiency after an appropriate time 
span. On the other hand, the attempt to evade competition 
can lead to segregation mechanisms where enterprises adapt 
to specific markets with their properties and regulations and 
use spatial heterogeneities, i.e. market boundaries that are 
caused by distance. Thus, business networks are described 
as analogous to ecological systems. 
Sierra and Debenham (2007) develop a negotiation 
model by defining the five dimensions legitimacy, options, 
goals, independence and commitment and combining it to 
the catchy word “LOGIC”. They give the advice to negotia-
tors to prepare by analysing their positions regarding the-
se dimensions. Additionally they introduce two “primitive 
concepts”: intimacy as degree of closeness and balance as 
degree of fairness. 
Cheng (Cheng et al. 2008) takes a look at “trust and 
knowledge sharing in green supply chains”. The inter-orga-
nizational knowledge sharing is investigated on 288 major 
“green” manufacturing firms in Taiwan. “Green” symboli-
zes strong effort to consider environment protection in the 
production. The majority of the firms is in the industries 
of electronic components, machinery and chemistry. They 
recognize “shared values”, “participation”, “communication”, 
“learning capacity”, “opportunistic behaviour” and “resour-
ce fitness” as the determinants for trust and in consequence 
for inter-organizational knowledge sharing.
Bojar and Drelichowski (2008) investigate the develo-
pment of enterprises in the agricultural industry in many 
EU member countries, there under Lithuania, Poland and 
Czech Republic. Despite of the fact that agricultural com-
panies are competitors, they have various common interests 
like building up the infrastructure for production on high 
quantitative scale, general development of their rural areas 
and therefore the obtainment of financial support by the 
EU. The attempt to increase the common market power 
compared with other competitors or in front of customers 
is a characteristic of the co-opetition approach. Thus, this 
paper is thematically close to that of Song (2003).
Another contribution to supply chain management 
comes from Bakshi and Kleindorfer (2008). They develop 
the special case where two agents are connected by a com-
mon threat, for instance terrorist attacks or natural hazards. 
They try to form contracts to share the risks and losses or 
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to share relevant information. A bargaining model is pro-
posed where a demander and a supplier intend to make 
a contract. However the demander suspects the potential 
supplier of exploiting the situation of insecurity and wai-
ting for a possibility to cheat. This refers to the concept of 
“moral hazard” in the new institutional economics (Göbel 
2002). Therefore the demander plans to give an incentive 
to the potential supplier to refrain from committing fraud 
(Ginevičius et al. 2008).
Ngo and Okura (2008) investigate privatization and its 
impact on the level of competition and cooperation in a 
mixed duopoly market, where a semi-public and a priva-
te firm meet at a market. They show that the semi-public 
company is more concerned about public welfare. The pri-
vate company exploits that as a free-rider. The existence of 
public or semi-public enterprises has positive effects on the 
surrounding business networks. 
Hu (Hu et al. 2008) proposes an evolutionary model of 
supply chains (similar to López-Gómez’ and Molina-Meyer’s 
model of population dynamics of 2007). They compare busi-
ness networks with many agents, where strictly competiti-
ve and strictly cooperative strategies prevail concurrently. 
They show that out of the competitive environment rather a 
situation evolves that is in the middle between competition 
and cooperation and provides the best profit perspectives 
in the whole system. Hence, in the long run a competitive 
outset is recognized as advantageous for the whole system 
in comparison with a totally cooperative outset.
Eriksson (2008) recognizes the problem in the Swedish 
construction industry that contract partners do not have 
sufficient reliance to behave cooperatively. In a survey of 87 
Swedish construction companies he claims to have reco-
gnized that mistrust prevents cooperation in the way how 
the transaction cost theory would predict it. His aim is to 
demonstrate the companies how to make unbiased and sys-
tematic procurement decisions.
Baumard (2008) gives a comprehensive overview over 
“learning strategies in coopetitive environments”. “Correct 
or cooperative behaviour is listed like generosity, contriti-
on, signalling of good faith, signalling of conventions, etc. 
These determine the “ambiguities and tensions of parado-
xical simultaneous cooperation and competition”. Baumard 
proposes a typology of “learning strategies”. For instance he 
understands the TIT-FOR-TAT principle (Axelrod 1984) as 
“reciprocal symmetric transparent learning” or the adverse 
selection (Akerlof 1970; Spence 1973) as “asymmetric open 
adverse learning”.
Guan (Guan et al. 2009) investigates wireless multime-
dia transmissions for many users and the optimal and fair 
resource allocation. 
They build a formal model where they understand the 
numerical results as evidence that co-opetition strategies are 
a good way to adapt to the changes of network conditions 
or participating users and help to achieve better quality of 
service (QoS), etc.
Sun (Sun et al. 2009) delves into evolutionary game 
theory as well, in order to find an “effective co-opetition 
mechanism of partners within high quality pork supply 
chain”. They claim that their model provides 8 factors that 
influence co-opetition: cooperation costs, cooperation 
income, “coefficient of income distribution”, decrease of 
cooperative risk, “coefficient of risk compensation”, proba-
bility of risk, management scale and “coefficients of either 
encouragement or punishment”.
Gueguen (2009) studies cooperative behavior of com-
panies in the information technology industry. He shows 
the importance of establishing technological standards 
and therefore the necessity for competitors to cooperate. 
As example, the five “major business ecosystems” of mobile 
operating systems are compared: Palm, Microsoft, Symbian, 
Research in Motion (RIM) and Linux. Gueguen highlights 
the relationships between and within the “business eco-
systems”. The possibilities are shown of how key agents of 
rivalling “business ecosystems” can cooperate.
Schoo (2009) describes the “Ambient Networks Project” 
that has been implemented 2004–2007 by a consortium of 
more than 40 companies, among them industrial enterpri-
ses, network operators and academic institutions like the 
Fraunhofer Institute Munich, Vodaphone, Nokia-Siemens, 
Ericsson, the Technical University Berlin, etc. The project 
addressed the future generation of mobile communication 
systems for voice and data transmission, 4G (4th generation). 
A framework has been developed that might allow compa-
nies to enter the market with low structural barriers. 
This is planned to be achieved by the development and 
provision of a comprehensive technological platform that 
regards authorization, availability and security aspects, and 
is therefore the basis for the provision of access (availability), 
applications, contents, etc. Companies that enter this indus-
try and do not have explicit bilateral agreements can colla-
borate through the utilization of “pre-shared keys”, etc.
4. Conclusions
The co-opetition perspective on business 
relationships
“Co-opetition” is a neologism representing the ambiva-
lence of competition and cooperation in business relations-
hips. It highlights the incomplete congruence of interests 
and goals of enterprises if their decisions are interdepen-
dent. It is an applied business theory in the spirit of game 
theory and an integrative theoretical bridge between 
the competitive business perspectives and  –
the cooperative perspective. –
Table 3. an overview of publications related to co-opetition with estimation of their importance
Year Author Issue
Competitive perspective:
1960 Schelling Game theory: strategy of conflict
1976 Jensen Institutions: principal-agent theory
1980 Porter Competitive Strategy: neoclassical competition and profit maximization
1985 Williamson Institutions: transaction cost economics
Cooperative perspective:
1988 Contractor, Lorange Advantages of cooperation
Co-opetition perspective:
1913 Cherington Advertising, distrib. and case studies (book)
1937 Hunt Claim to unify competition and cooperation
1992 Fischer IT company Novel’s business philosophy
1996 Brandenburger, Nalebuff “PARTS” model, value net, small case studies (book)
2002 Dagnino, Padula Incomplete “interest congruence”, change of perspectives: co-opetitive 
instead of purely competitive or cooperative
2003 Song Sea port industry
2004 Zineldin Co-opetitive partnerships
2004 Luo Multinational entersprises and co-opetition  (Book)
2005 Ren, Shi Reliance determining cooperation level
2006 Gurnani, Erkoc, Luo Free riders at supply chain investments
2006 Gnywali, He Properties of certain network positions
2006 Chen, Fan Stability of strategic alliances, repeat. games
2007 López-Gómez Partial cooperation with population dynamics*
2007 Sierra, Debenham Negotiation model “LOGIC”
2008 Cheng, Yeh, Tu Knowledge sharing in Taiwanese industries
2008 Baumard Learning strategies
2008 Bojar Agriculture in Lithuania, Poland, Czech Rep.
2008 Bakshi, Kleindorfer Bargaining with incomplete information in supply chains
2008 De Ngo, Okura Duopoly: private and semi-public enterprise
2008 Hu, Houdet “Evolutionary” supply chain, many agents*
2008 Eriksson Swedish construction industry
2009 Guan, Yuan Wireless multimedia transmissions
2009 Sun, Zhang, Lin Evolutionary game, pork supply chain*
2009 Gueguen Mobile operating systems
2009 Schoo “Ambient networks”, mobile communication
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Game theory is used as the mathematical instrument 
for the co-opetition theory in order to describe questions 
related to business relationships. 
brandenburger and Nalebuff’s contribution to coope-
tition research 
B/N understand co-opetition as an applied business 
theory in the spirit of game theory. They regard “players”, 
“added value”, “rules”, “tactics” and “scope” as the basic 
elements of co-opetition. However, the “PARTS” model 
is arbitrary and presumably in accordance to marketing 
considerations. B/N target a non-professional readership. 
Nevertheless B/N made a first step towards a theoretical 
foundation. They present many important distinctions in 
a non-structured way like:
Win-win vs. win-lose relationships in “value nets”, –
Individual customers vs. mass markets and –
Potentially vs. actually participating agents. –
Co-opetition:  relevant publications
As the most important publications are identified:
1. Dagnino and Padula (2002).
2. Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996).
3. Bakshi and Kleindorfer (2008).
4. Luo (2004).
Dagnino and Padula claim there should be a switch 
from the competitive and the cooperative perspectives to a 
co-opetition perspective. Dagnino and Padula criticize the 
neglecting of the foundation and structure of the co-ope-
tition theory. Bakshi and Kleindorfer introduce a bargai-
ning model with incomplete information in accordance to 
the principal-agent theory. Luo delves into co-opetition in 
international business.
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